UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-28-2008

Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34644

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34644" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
1706.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1706

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE

SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE,
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
and SCOTT BECKSTEAD, Individually,

PlaintiffslAppellants/Cross-Respondents

CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,

I

SUPREME COURT N O 34644

I

Brief of Respondent 1 Cross-Appellant
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Franklin

The Honorable Don L. Iiarding, District Judge

Steven R. Fuller
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Preston, Idaho 83263
Attorney for Appellants-Cross-Respondents

Clyde G. Nelson
Attoiney at Law
P.O. Box 797
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276
Attorney for Respondent-Cross-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i. ii
STATEMENTOFTHECASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.
ADDITIONALISSUESONAPPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
ISSUESONCROSS-APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
1.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO INVOKE ORDINANCE NO . 16.28.03013 . . . . . . . .8

I1.

THE CITY HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

111.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM . . . . . . . . . 16

IV .

THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 22.2004. DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
CLAIM PURSUANT TO 36.907. IDAHO CODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

V.

THE CITY WAS MISLED TO ITS INJURY BY BECKSTEAD'S
FAILURE TO INVOKE TIHE ORDINANCE OR TO TIMELY
.
SUBMIT A CLAIM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

VI .

TIHE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 5312-1 17.12.120.
AND 12.121. IDAI-I0 CODE; RULE 41. I.A.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

CROSS-APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING AN AWARD TO
THE CITY OF ITS ATTORNEY FEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES
BHA Investments,. Inc. v. CityofBoise. 141 Idaho 168. 108 P.3d 315(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C&G. Inc . v. Canyon Highway District No.4. 139 Idaho 140. 75 P.3d 194(2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Calkins v. Fruitland, 97 Idaho 263. 543 P.2d 166 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Cox v. City ofsandpoint. 140 Idaho 127. 90 P.3d. 352 (Ct. App. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving. Inc. . 141 Idaho 716. 117 P.3d 130
(2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.
. 32
Enterprise. Inc. v. Nampa City. 96 Idaho 734. 536 P.2d 729. (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Farber v. State. 102 Idaho 398. 630 P.2d 685 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Foster v. Kootenai Medical Center. 143 Idaho 425. 146 P.3d 691(Ct. App . 2006) . . . . . . . . . . 24
Independent School Dist . of Boise City v. Callister. 97 Idaho 59. 539 P.2d 987 (1975) . . . . . . .26
Larson v. Emmett Joint School Dist. No . 221. 99 Idaho 120. 577 P.2d 1168 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . 26
Magnuson Properties v. Coeur DXlene. 138 Idaho166. 59 P.3d 971(2002)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15. 16.20.21.22.23.27. 28
Mallory v. City ofMontpelier. 126 Idaho 446. 885 P.2d 1162. (Ct. App.1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
McQuillen v. City ofAmmon. 113 Idaho 719. 747 P.2d 741(1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19.22. 25
Mihalka v. Shepherd, 2008 Opinion No . 45, (March 28. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital. 130 Idaho 420. 942 P.2d 544 (1997) . . . . . . . 19.22. 25

Ralphs v. City of Spirit lake. 98 Idaho 225. 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19. 22
Ri$e v. Long 127 Idaho 841. 908 P.2d 143 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Seizer v. Dean. 1 18 Idaho 568. 798 P.2d 27 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls. 126 Idaho 587. 887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App . 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Wickrtvom v. North Idaho College. 111 Idaho 450. 725 P.2d 155 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

STATUTES AND RULES
$6.902(7). Idaho Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56.906. Idaho Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$6.907. Idaho Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
512.117. Idaho Code

.........................

512.120. Idaho Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
512.121. Idaho Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$50.219. Idaho Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rule 41. I.A.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rule 54. I.R.C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rule 68. I.R.C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORDINANCES
Ordinance No . 16.28.030B. Preston Municipal Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.
. 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, City of Preston, agrees with Plaintiffs statement of the case. In addition
thereto, following the decision by the district court, the Defendant City of Preston filed a Motion for
Costs and Attorney Fees supported by its Memorandum with a detailed listing of those fees. The
court subsequently ruled that the City was the prevailing party, awarded the City its costs, but denied
it attorney fees. The City filed a Cross-Appeal on the denial of the attorney fees. The City has
illcorporaled its brief on Cross-Appeal together with its Respondent's Brief,

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO NVOKE ORDNANCE NO. 16.28.030B

11.

THE CITY HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED

III.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM

IV.

THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 22,2004, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 56-907, IDAHO CODE

V.

THE CITY WAS MISLED TO ITS NSURY'BY BECKSTEAD'S FAILURE TO
INVOICE THE ORDINANCE OR TO TIMELY SUBMIT A CLAIM.

VI.

THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND cosrs
ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 5512-1 17, 12-120, AND 12-121, IDAHO CODE
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING AN AWARD TO THE CITY
OF ITS ATTORNEY FEES
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ARGUMENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

The Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Beckstead") is a real estate developer. The

Respondent is the City of Preston, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as "City"). In July, 2002, Beckstead
submitted a plat to the City for approval of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision (hereinafter
referred to as "Subdivision") consisting of twenty-two lots. (73, Beckstead Affidavit, R. Val. 1,
p.101; 75, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Val. 1, p. 175).
2.

City ordinance required Beckstead to connect the Subdivision to a six inch diameter

waterline. (73, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Val. 2, p. 201).

3.

While a six inch water main was available to which Becltstead could connect, Darrell

Wilburn, City Engineer, determined that the existing six inch line was connected to a four inch line
which would create a restriction in flow to the Subdivision. The Fire Marshall for the Franklin
County Fire District, a governmental entity separate and distinct froin the City, advised the City that
the District would not approve the connection unless the line were six inches in diameter for its
entire distance as the line would not provide adequate fire flow to the Subdivision if the four inch
restriction were allowed to remain in place. This requirement was imposed by the Franklin County
Fire District and not the City. (72-3, Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Val. 2, p. 233).

4.

Beckstead had three options for connection to the City water main:
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A. He could wait until the City completed its ten inch waterloop
project.
B. He could replace 1,000 feet of four inch line on Oneida Street, or
C. He could replace 1,700 feet of four inch line on 800 East Street.
Beckstead chose option C, the replacement of 1,700 feet of four inch line on 800 East Street,
although this option required the construction of an additional 700 feet of six inch line. The
Subdivision's twenty-two lots benefited hom the construction of the waterline as Beclcstead could
not have received Fire District approval without having constructed the same. (14-5, Affidavit of
Darrell Wilbum, R. Vol. 2, pp. 201-202; and14-5, Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2,
p. 234).
5.

The City had the right to require Beckstead to increase the diameter of the

line ("oversize") but if it did so, the City was then required to reimburse Beckstead for the
oversizing. The City required Beckstead to construct a twelve inch diameter line rather than a six
inch diameter line. (16-7, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p.'l75).
6.

The final plat for the Subdivision was approved by the City in July, 2003, and

Beclcstead installed the waterline on 800 East Street in October, 2003. (IS, 10, Affidavit of Jerry C.
Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 175). Beckstead was fully aware of his costs of construction by November 10,
2003. (75 and Ex. C-1 - C-3, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, p. 208)
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7.

Following construction and as the City had required Beclcstead to oversize the line,

Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer and Scott Martin computed the amount to be reimbursed to
Beckstead for the oversizing. This amount was $7,461.00. Wilburn and Martin computed these
figures on November 12,2003, and Beckstead was notified to file a claim against the City for said
sum, which claim was filed on December 16, 2003. Beclcstead was reimbursed $7,461.00 on
December 17,2003. (78, and Ex. A to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, pp. 202,204; 78, and
Ex. B, C to Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 175, 181, 182). Exhibit A to Darrell
Witburn's Affidavit was solely prepared by Wilburn and Martin based upon the City's estimate of
costs for six inch and twelve inch pipe.

8.

The City charges connection fees for hookups to a City watermain in the sum of

$2,500.00 per connection. These fees are to reimburse the City for its costs in making the
connection. The cost to the City for each connection in 2004 was $2,618.07. The present cost is
approximately $3,349.00. The City's connection fee from 2003 to the present has remained at
$2,500.00 for each connection. (712, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 176; 114 and Ex. B
to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 1, pp. 202, 205,206.)

9.

There have been five intervening connections made to the waterline installed by

Beckstead since October, 2003. Fees for four of those connections were paid on September 29,
2004. The fee for the remaining connection was paid on October 19,2004. All fees were paid prior
to Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004, and prior to the City being made aware that Beclcstead
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might be claiming some form of reimbursement. For the five intervening connections made to the
waterline constructed by Beckstead, the first four connections were made on October 19,2004, the
fast one was made on November 16, 2004. No &ifher fees have been received by the City for
connections made to the waterline installed by Beckstead (710,ll and Ex. D, E, to Afidavit of Jerry
C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 175, 183, 184-186). Thus, all fees had been paid to the City for its costs
in making connections on behalf of residents of the colnmunity prior to receiving any
communication from Beckstead that he might be interested in reimbursement.
10.

Beckstead did not colninunicate with the City about reimbursement of his costs for

constructing the line until October, 22,2004. On that date Beckstead sent a letter to the City citing
Section 16.28.030B of the Preston Municipal Code asking to meet with the City "to discuss the
process of such reimbursement", and advised the City ihat he was aware "that several water
connections had been made to that line", and that the City should let him know "if there is any
information that you may need from me showing actual costs of installation ofthat line". Beclcstead
submitted no costs or damages to the City for its consideration. The City denied his request to meet
and discuss reimbursement by letter to him from Clyde G. Nelson dated November 16,2004 (713
and Ex. F, G, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 176, 187, 188-189).
11.

There were no further requests or demands for reimbursement made to the City by

Beckstead until the City received a letter dated April 11, 2006 from Beckstead's counsel Steven
Fuller some 17-18 months later. The letter replied to Mr. Nelson's letter to Beckstead of November
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16,2004. Mr. Fuller requested that the City reconsider its position and meet with Beclcstead and Mr.
Fuller to discuss reimbursement. As was conspicuously absent from Beckstead's letter of October
22,2004, Mr. Fuller made no claim for damages or costs incurred by Beckstead that the City might
owe him. The City rejected the request by letter from Mr. Nelson to Mr. Fuller dated May 24,2006.
(714,15, and Ex. H, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 176,190; Ex. C to Second Amended
Complaint, R. Val. 2, pp. 71-74)
12.

On July 3 1,2006, approximately 20 months afler the City Itad rejected Beckstead's

request for a conference with the City to discuss reimbursement, and approximately 32 months after
construction was completed by Beclcstead, Beckstead filed aNotice of Claim with the City, and for
the first time set forth, and made the City aware of, the construction costs and damages he allegedly
suffered and claimed. The damages alleged were $10,603.60. Later, pursuant to a Second Amended
Complaint filed by Beckstead on or about May 2,2007, Beckstead alleged that his damages were
$13,153.64 in that he had made a mistake in computing the amount of construction costs. (716 and

Ex. I to Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Val. 1, p. 176; Second Amended Complaint, R. Val. 1, pp.
58-76).
13.

Not until July 3 1,2006, when the Notice of Claim was filed by Mr. Fuller with the

City, was the City made aware of the alleged construction costs incurred by Mr. Beckstead and the
amount of his alleged damages. Although Beckstead knew of his costs and damages when he
completed construction, and at the latest, in November, 2003, he did not advise the City of this
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amount until July 3 1,2006, when he filed his Notice of Tort Claim. (72, 3, 4, Third Affidavit of
Darrel Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, pp. 269(a) - 269(b); 75, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, pp. 207208; 74,5,6, Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 2, pp. 268-269).
14.

Never, during the platting of the subdivision, construction thereof or thereafter,

did Beckstead discuss reimbursement with the City Clerk, City Engineer, or City Council. Prior to
October 22,2004, Beckstead did not mention reimbursement to the City. No competitive bids for
construction had been obtained. No money had been paid by Beckstead to the City. No verification
of costs was made. No engineering drawings showing benefitted intervening properties had been
prepared and no agreement had been entered into with Beckstead to define the commencement date
of the agreement, the terms of the agreement, the properties benefitted and the amount which would
be due from each intervening property owner or the amount to be collected by the City. (79, Affidavit
of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol.1, p. 175; 712, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, p. 202)
15.

The district court issued its Memorandum Decision in favor of the City denying

Beckstead's claims, and the City avoided all liability in the case. (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol.
2, pp. 274-280.) Judgment was entered in favor ofthe City on August 16,2007. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 281282)
16.

Tlie City requested an award of attorney fees in its Answer (R. Vol. 1, pp. 8 1-87) and

Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees (R. Vol. 2, pp. 283-299) pursua~llto $3 12-117, 12-120, and 12121, LC., and Rules 54 and 68, I.R.C.P. The City timely filed its Motion accompanied by an
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Affidavit of counsel and Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. As part of the
Affidavit, proof was submitted that the City had offered to settle for the sum of $4,000.00 by written
letter dated February 13, 2007. (R. Vol. 2, pp 287-288), and an Offer of Judgment dated February
16, 2007, for the sum of $5,000.00. (R. Vol. 2, pp 285-292). These offers were rejected by
Beckstead.
Following hearing on the motion, the court entered its Memorandum Decision on attorney
fees and an Amended Judgment on October 30,2007, finding that the City was the prevailing party,
awarding it costs on appeal, but denying the City's request for attorney fees. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 327335). The City filed its Notice of Cross Appeal on November 2,2007, alleging that the district court
had erred in denying the City attorney fees in this action. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 336-338)

I.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO INVOKE
ORDINANCE NO. 16.28.030B

Beckstead makes the argument that the City failed to conlply with the terms of its ordinance
in refusing to reimburse Becltstead for the waterline construction. Beckstead chooses to ignore the
fact that he failed to take the initial steps rcquired by the ordinance to subject to the City to the
reimbursement process.
The ordinance was codified in the Preston Municipal Code under Section 16.28.030Bwhich
reads as follows:
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Whenever any intervening property ("off-site") is benefitted by the installation of any
of the required facilities, the subdivider may pay the costs of such facilities to the
city, such costs to be determined by competitive bids solicited by the city, together
with verified engineering costs required therefore. The City shall thereafter enter a
deferred credit in its books and records and shall charge the benefitted intervening
property owners the fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time
such connections are made. Such fees shall then be returned to the subdivider to
reimburse the costs of the installation of the facilities; such agreement for
reimbursement shall extend for a maximum period of five years from initial date of
agreement after which time no further reimbursement shall be made to the
subdivider. The city may also elect to reimburse the subdivider for such "off-site"
facilities in full or in part after the subdivider has furnished the City with acceptable
evidence that a11 agreed number of housing units are occupied. No interest shall
accrue or become payable on such reimbursement. Engineering drawings showing
benefitted property shall be prepared by the city engineer and copies forwarded to the
sewer, water and streets departments of the City.
Thus, the ordinance talces effect, if and when, the subdivider (Beckstead) pays the costs of the
improvements to the City based upon competitive bids and verified engineering costs. Only then
does the City have the duty to enter a deferred credit in its boolts and charge the benefitted
intervening property owners fees for connections necessary to reimburse the subdivider. The fees
are those collected as a result of an agreement for reimbursement between the City and the
subdivider and are to be collected over a maximum period of five years from the initial date ofthe
agreement. Once the five years has expired, the City has no duty to pay the subdivider from fees
collected although the subdivider may not have been fully reimbursed.
Beckstead argues that the use of the word "may" in the ordinance places no duty on a
subdivider to activate the ordinance. Becltstead argues that the use of the word "may" malces it a
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"permissive or noiunandatory" duty upon the subdivider. Beckstead further argues that the City
should have required competitive bids and verified engineering costs regardless of the fact that
Beckstead failed to notify the City that he wished to be reimbursed under the ordinance and instead
constructed the line on ltis own.
Beckstead cites the case of R$e v. Long 127 Idaho 841, 848; 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) for
the definition of the word "may". (Appellants' Brief, p. 15) There the court stated in defining "may"
that the word expressed "the right to exercise discretion".
The district court ruled that Beckstead failed to invoke the ordinance thereby waiving any
right to reimbursement. The district court stated:

" The ordinance gives a subdivider the right to reimbursement for the expenses they
incur for benefitting offsite properties. There is a process by which the subdivider
acquires this right. First, the subdivider may pay the City the costs for installation of
any required facilities. Second, the cost paid to the City is to be determined by
competitive bids solicited by the City along with engineering costs. Third, the costs
are verified. Lastly, the ordinance also requires an agreement between the City and
the Developer". (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, p. 276.)
The court also stated:
"......the options are either to pay the costs and invoke the ordinance, or not to pay the
costs and forego the reimbursement provided under the ordinance. Becltstead opted
to do the work himself and thus the City was never put on notice as to their
ordinance because they created it. Nevertheless, the City has a right to know option
of soliciting competitive bids. The City undoubtedly knew of when a person is
invoking the ordinance. By opting not to pay the City the costs and do the work
himself, Mr. Beckstead failed to initiate tlte ordinance and thereby put the City on
notice. (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, pp.276-277)
The court went on to say:
Respondent / Cross-AppellantBrief - Page I0

"The second step of the ordinance provides a method by which the costs are to be
determined. There is no evidence that Mr. Beckstead ever formed an agreement with
the City prior, or during this project, by which the City could determine the cost of
the project. According to Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion fov Summary
Judgment Beckstead indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the
developmellt of Creamery I-Iollow Subdivision. Mr. Beckstead knew of the
ordinance and could have opted to pay the costs and bid on the project himself. The
ordinance is designed to benefit those who pay for the costs which are solicited by
the City. There is no evidence that the City ever had the opportunity to solicit
coinpetitive bids because Mr. Beckstead did not follow the procedure of the
ordinance. He cannot claim reimbursement expost facto." (Memorandum Decision,
R. Val. 2, p. 277)
The ruling by the district court. is correct. The term "may" used in the ordinance allows the
subdividerdiscretion to invoke the ordinance and pay the costs to the City. However, before the City
is mandated to call for competitive bids and to verify costs, the subdivider must exercise that
discretion and invoke the ordinance. If the subdivider fails to do so, the City cannot insure that the
lowest cost of installation is obtained through competitive bids which directly affects the fees
subsequently charged by the City and paid by the intervening connectors. The City is not able to
enter a deferred credit in its books on behalf of the subdivider, establish prorata shares for the
intervening property owners, determine which properties are benefitted by the installation, or what
fees to charge. The ordinance requires that the city engineer prepare drawings "showing benefitted
property". Without the subdivider exercising his discretion and invoking the ordinance prior to
construction, none of the duties imposed upon the City are activated.
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The process is simple:
1. The subdivider notifies the City that he wishes to invoke the ordinance.
2. The City calls for bids.

3. Upon receipt of bids, the lowest bid is established, and the engineer verifies the
costs.
4. The subdivider pays the bid price to the City.

5. The engineer determines which intervening properties will be benefitted and

the prorata share of the cost of each intervening property.

6. An agreement is prepared establishing the terms of the agreement, its starting
and ending date, identifying the intervening properties, the amount to be
reimbursed to the subdivider, the prorata share that each intervening property
owner will pay if connected, and the fees that will be assessed by the City to each
intervening property owner necessary to reimburse the subdivider.
7. The bid is awarded and construction is completed .

8. The City enters the deferred credit into its boolcs on behalf of the subdivider
and imposes additional connection fees on intervening property owners if and
when connected, in addition to the normal fees imposed by the City for it
connecting users to its water main.
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By Becltstead failing to involte the ordinance, and instead constructing the line on his own,
none of the required elements of the ordinance could be initiated. Beckstead did not notify the City
that he wanted reimbursement. Instead, he constructed the line in October 2003, and waited until
October 22, 2004, to send a letter to the City requesting to meet with the City to discuss
reimbursement. The City denied that request for reimbursement by letter of the city attorney of
November 16,2004. At the time of Beckstead's reauest, the City had already collected all fees for
all intervening connections made to the line. which fees merely reimbursed the City for its costs in
making the connections. As Beckstead failed to invoke the ordinance, no additional fees with which
to reimburse Beclcstead had been collected. No other connections have been made to the waterline.
11.

THE CITY HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED

Beckstead argues that the retention of the fees paid by intervening property owners would
be a windfall to the City and result in unjust enrichment of the City. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Prior to construction of Beckstead's subdivision, all intervening properties which
eventually connected to the line were served by a four inch line. When Beckstead applied for a
subdivision of twenty-two lots, the Franklin County Fire District, not the City, ruled that a six inch
connection to an existing four inch line would not provide adequate fire flow for his subdivision.
The District would not approve a six inch connection to the four inch line. Without replacing the
four inch line with a six inch line, Beckstead's subdivision could not he approved. He chose to
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replace the four inch line in order to obtain adequate fire flow for his subdivision. (72-5, Second
Affidavit of Darrell Wilbum, R. Vol. 2, pp. 233-234) This resulted in 700 feet of additional pipe
being installed by Beckstead as he selected a route which was more convenient for him. The six inch
line was not needed by the City as it already had a four inch line serving adjoining properties. It was
necessary for Beckstead because he could not obtain the necessary fire flowpermit from the Franklin
County Fire District without constructing that line. Without the fire flow, he could not obtain
approval from the Fire District. Thus, no subdivision would be constructed. The line benefitted
Beckstead only.
The City charges $2,500.00 for each water connection made to the water main to reimburse
the City for its costs in making the connection. The costs for a connection in 2004 were $2,618.07.
The present cost for connecting is $3,349.00. (79, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, p. 202).
There have been five connections made to the waterline constructed by Beckstead. The fees
of $2,500.00 per comlection for all five connectionswere paid prior to Becltstead's letter of October
22,2004. Four of the five connections were made prior to his letter and the last one within a month
thereafter. No other connections have been made. (710,11,12, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol.
1, pp. 175-176). The fees collected were ones which only partially reimbursed the City for & costs.
Because Beclcstead failed to notify the City before fees were paid and connections made, the City
collected only what was owing it for its costs. It received no monies in excess of its costs, thus no
windfall. The replacement of the four inch line did not benefit the City and was required by the
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Franklin County Fire District, not the City. The water line has only benefitted Beckstead enabling
him to construct his subdivision. The City had a four inch line which would have served the
intervening property owners.
Beckstead seeks recovery of the entire cost of his construction from the City for the fees
collected by the City for five intervening connections. The total collected by the City was
$12,500.00. If this were permitted, five connections would nearly reimburse Beckstead for all his
costs, although lie greatly benefitted fromconstructionof this line. Yet, Beckstead chooses to ignore
the benefit he obtained for his Subdivision and the twenty-two lots which were connected to the line.
Without the benefit of an agreement between the parties designating the benefitted properties, the
prorata share required of each, the amount of additional fees to be charged by the City, and the
amount to be paid by each connector, a windfall results. However, it is a windfall to Beckstead
resulting in his unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, Beclcstead failed to file a notice of claim with the City claiming unjust
enrichment. It is essential that Becltstead have made a claim for unjust enrichment prior to filing
suit, if he wished to recover for the same.
In Magnuson Properties v. Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971(2002) Magnuson
argued that the Tort Claims Act (Ch.9, Title 6 ) notice requirement did not apply to its equitable
claims. The court refused to consider that contention as it had been raised for the first time on
appeal. Nevertheless, tlie court stated as follows:
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Even if Magnuson had properly raised the issue, this Court has construed I.C.
550-219 to require a claimant to file notice of all claims for damages against
a government entity, tort or otherwise, as directed by the ICA. (138 Idaho at
170, citing Seizer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572,798 P.2d 27 (1990)
Beckstead failed to claim unjust enrichment by his letter of October 22,2004 or his Notice
of Claim of July 3 1, 2006. Thus, his claim of unjust enrichment should be denied.

111.

BECKSTEAD FAILED TO TIMELY
FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM

Beckstead failed to file notice of claim with the City pursuant to statute, and his claim
against the City is barred.
550-219, I.C. states:
50-219. DAMAGE CLAIMS. All claims for damages against a city
must be filed as prescribed by Chapter 9, Title 6, Idaho Code.
The definition of a "claim" is set forth in $6-902(7):
"Claim" means any wriflen demand to recover money damages from
a governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally
entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent or
otherwise wrongful act or olnission of a governmental entity or its
employee when acting within the course or scope of his employment.
The time for filing a claim with a governmental entity is set forth in 56-906, I.C.
6-906. FILING CLAIMS AGAINST POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
OR EMPLOYEE --TIME. All claims against a political subdivision
[subdivision] arising under the provisions of this act and all claims
against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission
of the employee within the course or scope of his employment shall
be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political
Respondent / Cross-AppellantBrief - Page 16

subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days ikom the date the
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is
later.
The requirements for the content of a claim are prescribed in 56-907, LC. which reads in part
as follows:
6-907. CONTENTS OF CLAIMS -- FILING BY AGENT OR
ATTORNEY -- EFFECT OF INACCURACIES. All claims presented
to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately describe the
conduct and circumstanceswhich brought about the injury or damage,
describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known,
and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a
statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the time of
presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six (6) months
immediately prior to the time the claim arose.
Beckstead completed construction in October, 2003. At that time he lcnew his construction
costs. (75 and Ex. C1-C3, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, p. 208; 73, Third Affidavit of
Beckstead, R. Vol. 2, p. 271).
The district court ruled that Beckstead was fully aware of his costs at the time of completion
of construction but had failed to timely submit a notice of claim within 180 days thereafter. The
district court opined that the October 22,2004, letter from Beckstead "may suffice as a claim" but
ruled that if that were the case, Beckstead had not filed the same within 180 days after completion
of construction when he was aware of the costs. The district court found:
"Beckstead knew the costs of the project on November 12,2003, as
evidenced by Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to
Defindent'sReply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 73
where Becltstead states, "Defendant had knowledge at the time the
pipeline was installed of the costs incurred by myself in purchasing
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the pipe for the project." This necessitates Beckstead's knowledge of
the costs as well. If the City is expected to be able to discern the costs
of the project from this Mr. Beckstead should be held to at least that
same standard. The attached invoice for the pipe cost is signed by the
City Engineer on November 12, 2003, after the labor had been
performed. Beckstead failed to make his claim at the same time he
submitted the invoice despite having knowledge of the cost and the
project being finished. Mr. Beckstead did not meet the 180 day
deadline because the letter was not sent until October 22, 2004,
almost a year later. The attachment is Beckstead's ThivdAfJidavit in
Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment dated November 12, 2003, marked the beginning of the
tolling because Beckstead was fully apprised at that time of the injury
and damages as well as the government's role. Doe v. Durtschi, 110
Idaho 466 (1986). Plaintiffs claim is barred under I.C. 56-906 and
the 180 day time limit for claims against Municipalities."
(Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, pp. 278-279)
The district court's ruling in that Beckstead had not timely filed a notice of claim is correct.
The court in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398,630 P.2d 685 (1981) and again in C&G, Inc. v.
Canyon Highway District No. 4,139 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003) found that the date aconstruction
project is completed triggers the notice requirement of 56-906 LC. As Beclcstead completed his
construction of the 800 East waterline in October, 2003, and was aware of the costs, he was required
to file a Notice of Claim no later than May, 2004.
Beckstead purchased and installed 1,240 feet of waterline, and the 460 feet of line provided
by the City for a total of 1,700 feet. He received billings at the time of installation from his
contractor and material providers. Copies of invoices from Irrigation Aid Co. and WR White Supply
for pipe totaling 1,240 feet, and an invoice from Gary's Backhoe Service for excavation work were
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received by Becltstead on or about the time that he completed the construction project. The City was
first made aware of these costs in Beckstead's Response to Discovery of 2007. (15 and Ex. C to
Affidavit of Clyde Nelson, R. Vol. 2, pp. 208,213-215) Beckstead was aware of the costs of his
improvements and labor when he completed his construction in October, 2003. His cause of action,
if any, arose at that time. As he was aware of the amount he alleges should have been reimbursed
to him from future connections to the line at that time, he was required to male a claim against the
City. The court stated in Mitchell v. Bingkam Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420,423,942 P.2d 544

"This Court has held that "@]nowledge of facts which would put a reasonably
prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will
start the running of the [I80 days]." McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719,
722,747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987). The Court has further held that the statutory period
begins to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act even if the full extent of
damages is not known at that time. Id See also Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98
Idaho 225,227,560 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1977). In a recent case, the Court of Appeals
clarified the amount of knowledge required to begin the notice period: "The statute
does not begin running when a person f~illyunderstands the mechanism of the inji~ry
and the government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would
cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances
surrounding the incident." Mallory v. City ofMontpelier, 126 Idaho 446,448, 885
P.2d 1162,1164 (Ct.App. 1994).The claimant in Mallory had argued that the notice
period should not start running until she knew the exact cause of her injury. The
Court of Appeals held that "such an interpretation would allow a party to delay
completion of an investigation for inonths or even years before submitting a notice
under the [ITCAJ." 126 Idaho at 449, 885 P.2d at 1165.
Nevertheless, Beckstead presented no claim prepared in accordance with $6-907 until July
3 1,2006, nearly 32 months later. If the letter of October 22,2204, constituted a claim, neither claim
was filed within the 180 day period required in 56-906, I.C.
Respondent / Cross-Appellant Brief - Page 19

There have been only five connections to the waterline by intervening third parties since
Beckstead constructed the waterline. Four of these connections were made on October 12,2004 and
one onNovember 16,2004. No connection has been made since that time. Beclcstead was aware of
these connections as evidenced by his letter of October 22, 2004 to the City wherein he refers to
"several water connections" having been made for which he sought his meeting to discuss
reimbursement. His request was denied by the City on November 16, 2004 by letter of Clyde
Nelson, City Attorney. If the date of completion of the project was not the date the "claim arose or
reasonably should have been discovered" and the City's response of November 16,2004 is deemed
to be the "wrongful act" complained of, the Notice of Claim presented by Beckstead's counsel was
not filed with the City for. twenty-two months. In either scenario, Beckstead has not met the
requirements of 56-906 requiring him to file a Notice of Claim with the City within 180 days after
the claim arose or should have been discovered. At the very least, Beckstead was aware on
November 16,2004, that his request for reimbursement was denied. Beckstead's Complaint is for
payment of those kinds by the City to Beckstead. Thus, Beckstead was required to file a Notice of
Claim, if not within 180 days after October, 2003, then at the very least within 180 days after
November 16,2004.
In Magnuson Properties v. Coeur D'Alene, supra, the Court addressed a situation similar to,
if not exactly on point, to the question presented in this case. Magnuson was the owner of

undeveloped property it wished to develop. As part of the approval of the subdivision on this
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property, the city required Magnuson to extend a sewer tine from its property to an adjoining parcel
owned by a third party. Magnuson objected because of the increased cost to it. Magnuson stated
that a city engineer had advised its representatives that the city would reimburse Magnuson for the
additional cost to Magnuson as a result of the extension of the sewer line. Magnuson stated that it
relied upon this representation to extend the line. On May 10, 1996, at Magnuson's direction, the
general contractor submitted a statement of reimbursable costs to the city. The contractor itemized
the extracosts attributable to the extensionof $30,802.00,and demanded the city pay Magnuson that
amount. The city responded to this request on August 13, 1996, denying the existence of any
agreement between the city and Magnuson and denying the demand for reimbursement. The city
acknowledged its policy of requiring property owners to extend sewer lines to the farthest boundary
of the property when installing a sewer line. I-Iowever, the city's policy was to only reimburse
property owners for costs associated with enlarging the size of sewer pipe and deeper excavation.
Magnusou made repeated attempts to discuss the request for reimbursement with the city. The city
met With Magnuson on November 7, 1996 and reiterated its denial of Magnuson's claim for
reimbursement. Magnuson paid his contractor the sum requested to be reimbursed on November
11,1996, and filed a Notice of Claim against the city on February 18,1997. Magnuson filed suit on
October 16, 1998. The city filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Magnuson's
claim was barred by $50-219 and $6-906, Idaho Code, and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the city. This decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court upheld the
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decision of the district court. The Court held:
A. The Time For Filing Notice Of A Claim Under I.C. 5s 50-219 And 6906 Began To Run When Magnuson Received The City's August 13,
1996 Letter Of Denial.
I.C. $8 50-219 (2000) requires filing any claim for damages against a
govermnent entity as required by the ITCA. IDAHO CODE $5 6-901 (2000).
A claimant has one hundred eighty (180) days from the day they knew, or
should have known, of the claim to provide notice of the claim to the
government entity. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-906 (2000). This notice requirement
applies equally to tort claims and claims for breach of contract. Enterprise,
Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 737-38, 536 P.2d 729, 732-33 (1975);
IDAHO CODE 8850-219 and 6-906 (2002).
The 180-day notice period begins to run at the occurrence of a wrongful act,
even if the extent of damages is not known or is unpredictable at the time.
Ralphsv. CityofSpiritLake,98 Idaho 225,227,560P.2d 1315,1317 (1977).
"Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on
inquiry," triggers the 180-dayperiod. McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho
719,722,747 P.2d 741,744 (1987). Compliance with the notice requirement
is a "mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit [against a city], the
failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate." Id. A claimant
is not required to know all the facts and details of a claim because such a
prerequisite would allow aclaimant to delay completion of their investigation
before triggering the notice requirement. Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial
IJbsp.,l30 Idaho 420,423,942 P.2d 544,547 (1997).
The record reflects that, at the very latest, Magnuson had knowledge of the
City's August 13, 1996 letter on August 15, 1996, which places Magnuson's
February 18,1997 notice beyond the 180-day period. The City's letter denies
the existence of any agreement between the City and Magnuson and rejects
Magnuson's request for reimbursement. As of August 15,1996, areasonable
and prudent person would have knowledge of facts of a wro~~gful
act, i.e., the
City's denial of andlor breach of the alleged contract. Therefore, the 180-day
notice period begail on August 15, 1996, and Magnuson failed to provide
timely notice of its claim. 138 Idaho 169-170
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Beckstead submitted a letter on October 22,2004 requesting to meet with the City to discuss
reimbursement. The City denied that request and any reimbursement by its response of November
16,2004. Pursuant to the Magnuson case, the time period for filing Beckstead's claim colnmenced
on November 16,2004, and expired on May 16,2005. Beckstead did not file a notice of ciaim until
July 3 1,2006. The notice of claim was filed more than 180 days after the City's denial of meeting
and reimbursement. Consequently, Beckstead failed to provide timely notice of his claim, and
cannot seelc recovery against the City.

IV.

THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 22, 2004, DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 56-907,
IDAHO CODE

86-907, LC, prescribes the required contents of a claim. These include an accurate
description of the circumstances causing the damages, a description of those damages, the time and
place they occurred, the persons involved, and the amount of damages claimed. Defendant attempts
to assert that his letter of October 22,2004, constituted sufficient notice of claim under the statute.
The inadequacy of this letter to constitute a statutory claim is evident from its contents. The letter
makes no demand to recover money damages from the City as required by $6-902(7), I.C., but
merely requests a meeting to discuss reimbursement; it fails to designate the materials provided or
labor performed which would give rise to the claim; it does not describe the circumstances giving
rise to the claim; it fails to set forth the parties connecting to the line from whom Beckstead asserts
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the City should have obtained fees for reimbursement to him where the comlections had been made;
and more importantly, it fails to state an amount of damages. This letter request was denied by the
City pursuant to letter from its attorney dated November 16, 2004. Beckstead appears to have
accepted this denial by the City waiting until April 11,2006, to send a letter to the City through his
attorney renewing his request for a meeting with the City to discuss reimbursement. The amount of
damages allegedly suffered by Beckstead, was not raised by his letter of October 22,2004, nor was
it raised in his April 11, 2006 letter. It was not until July 31, 2006, that Beckstead filed a claim
setting forth the elements required in $6-907,1.C. and the amount of damages claimed. Obviously,
counsel for Beckstead recognized the inadequacy of Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004, by
renewing his request to meet with the City in April, and subsequently filing a Notice of Claim in July
which did meet the criteria of $6-907, I.C.
The Court has addressed the requirements for a proper claim and the inadequate provisions
of certain claims which render a claiin invalid. In Foster v. Kootenai Medical Center, 143 Idaho

425, 146 P.3d 691 (Ct. App. 2006) Plaintiff's attorney submitted a letter to the Idaho State Board of
Medicine (ISBM) of medical malpractice against a doctor performing an operation at the county
medical center. The hospital received that correspondence from ISBM. The district court found that
the Plaintiff had never filed a formal notice of tort claim with the county, and that even assuming that
the letter did constitute notice, the fact that it omitted a statement of damages rendered it inadequate
under $6-907, LC. The Court found that no claim had been submitted to the hospital pursuant to $6-

906 I.C.
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In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315(2004) Bravo
submitted a claim to the city setting forth the amount of damages but failing to mention another party
"Splitting Kings". The Court ruled that this notice of claim was untimely. Bravo and Splitting Kings
then elected to rely upon a notice of claim filed by BHA. Ilowever that claim failed to mention the
names of Bravo and Splitting Kings. The Court ruled that because the notice of claim filed by BHA
did not include the names and addresses of either Bravo or Splitting Kings, it was not sufficient
under $6-907, LC. and said claims were barred under state law.
In Mitchell v. Bingharn Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420,942 P.2d 544(1997), the Plaintiff
was overdosed by the hospital. This resulted in injury to her. Plaintiffs attorney spoke with the
hospital administrator about the Plaintiffs claim prior to the expiration of the 180 day notice period
required under $6-906, LC. He also submitted copies of documents to the hospital that identified
the Plaintiffs, the hospitalization and chaxges at issue, and their damages as known at that time.
However, due to negotiations between the hospital and Plaintiffs attorney, the Plaintiff failed to file
anotice of claim pursuant to $6-906, LC. within 180 days. The Plaintiff attempted to assert that his
two phone conversations with the hospital and his submission of documentation to the hospital
constituted a valid claim under 56-907 LC. The court ruled oral communications made
by the Plaintiff, or her attorney, did not constitute the filing of a claim as it is required by $6-902(7),
I.C. and 56-907, I.C. The Court stated that the conversations and the submission of the
documentation did not preclude the requirement for a Plaintiff to file a formal claim with a
governmental entity.
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The Court has also stated in McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d
741(1987) that actual knowledge or notice given to a govermnental entity does not excuse a Plaintiff
from filing a formal written claim. There the Court stated:
Further, in actions against governmental entities, plaintifk are not exempt
from the notice of claim requirements because of substantial actual notice
having been given. Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97
Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975), disapproved on other grounds, Larson v.
Emmett Joint School Dist. No. 221,99 Idaho 120, 577 P.2d 1168 (1978).
Calkins v. Fruitland, 97 Idaho 263,543 P.2d 166 (1975). See also Newlan v.
State, supra.
In Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587,887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994), a city
employee was discharged from employment. She filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the city against
another employee of the city for interference with contract. The court ruled she had not described
the conduct and circumstances which brought about the alleged injury or complied with the other
specifications of 36-907, I.C. regarding that claim. Tl~erefore,the Court found that the Notice of
Claim was insufficient under 56-907, I.C.
In Wichtrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986) the Plaintiffs
attended a course at the college and successfully completed the same. They sued the college for
damages upon discovery that they were not qualified as entry level journeymen after successful
completion of the course, contrary to a statement made in a school bulletin. Prior to suing the
college, the Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to the college detailing the Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with
the course and their intent to take legal action if the college did not compensate them for sacrifices
made in attending the course for 11months. The letter failed to state Plaintiffs' names and addresses,
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the amount of any damages they had incurred, and the nature of any injuries suffered. The trial court
held that the Idaho Tort Claims Act applied, and the Plaintiff had not complied with the provisions
of I.C. 56-907. It granted Summary Judgment on behalf of the college. The Plaintiffs appealed. The
Court, after quoting 56-907, LC., held in favor of the college stating:
The demand letter of August 2 I, 1984 failed to serve as notice of a
claim pursuant to the I.T.C.A., since it failed to state the names and
addresses of the claimants, the amounts of claimed damages and the
nature of the injury claimed. The claim is, therefore, barred. I.C.
$6-907; (1 11 Idaho 452)
Becltstead attempts to distinguish Magnuson from this case stating that he has treated the
letter of October 22,2004, as a notice of claim from its inception. If that were the case, why the
subsequent letter of April 11,2006 from Beckstead's counsel requesting the meeting, and why the
necessity to file aNotice of Claim on July 31,2006? Beckstead's counsel realized that the initial
letter of October 22,2004 was inadequate and did not constitute a claim.
Beckstead quotes Justices Eisman and Waiters in their special concurring opinion in
Magnuson stating that the letter of May 10, 1996, constituted a claim and after the city's denial in

that case, Magnuson would have been allowed to file suit. That was not the opinion of the Court.
The opinion of the court was that the letter of May 10, 1996, may have "arguably" constituted a
notice of claim under the ITCA. As that issue had not been raised, it was not considered by the
court.
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We do not know the contents of the Magnuson letter of May 10, 1996, what criteria of $6907, I. C. it may have set forth, and whether it met the requirements of a notice of claim. However,
we do know that the letter in Magnuson specifically made a claim for damages in the form of a
statement of reimbursable costs of $30,802.00 and demanded the citv pay Magnuson that amount.
(Beckstead only advised the City that he would like to meet and discuss reimbursement). Thus, we
know that a crucial element of a claim, the amount of damages, was set forth by Magnuson.
Beckstead failed to allege damages or make demand for payment of a specific amount either in his
letter of October 22,2004, or his counsel's letter of April 1I, 2006.
Beckstead knew the amount of his damages by November, 2003. He had purchased the pipe,
contracted for backhoe digging, and performed labor on the project himself. Thus, his costs were
lmown to him. I-Ie knew that connectionshad been made in October, 2004. Yet, he failed to itemize
his costs and make demand upon the City for a specific sum, failed to describe the injury or damage,
and failed to set forth the time and date when his alleged claim arose. Beckstead's letter fails to meet
the requirements of $6-907, I.C. and does not constitute a claim.

V.

THE CITY WAS MISLED TO ITS INJURY BY
BECKSTEAD'S FAILURE TO INVOKE THE
ORDINANCE OR TO TIMELY SUBMIT A CLAIM.

The flaws in the letter of October 22, 2004, rendered that letter insufficient to constitute
notice and the City was misled to its injury thereby. Cox v. City of Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 90
P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2003). The City denied Beckstead's letter of October 22,2004, by its counsel's
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letter of November 16, 2004. Beckstead took no further action until April, 2006. The letter of
October 22,2004, was definitely inadequate under the terms of 96-907, Idaho Code. At the very
least, it failed to contain any reference to the amount of damages claimed. At the time of submission
of this letter, the City had received all fees from the five connections made to the line. Those fees
were for the City's costs of connection. As Beckstead had failed to advise the City of his intent to
attempt to invoke the ordinance, and his untimely submission of his letter, the City was precluded
from collecting additional fees from intervening connections with which to reimburse Beckstead.
The City cannot retroactively attempt to cure Beckstead's failure to invoke the ordinance, and any
payment to Beckstead would be from funds derived from the City's collection of its own connection
fees, not from fees generated by an ordinance of the City assessing additional fees for
reimbursement,
VI.

THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
PURSUANT TO @12-117,12-120,12-121, IDAHO
CODE AND RULE 41, I.A.R.

The City was the prevailing party in the district court action. The district court found for the
City denying all of Beckstead's claims. Beckstead failed to take preliminary action in requesting the
City to invoke the ordinance. Instead, he waited for nearly one year before asking to meet with the
City to discuss reimbursement. He did not file a notice of claim for nearly three years. Iiis action
in pursuing his claim is without reasonable basis in law or fact and is frivolous. Thus, the City should
be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to $§12-117 and 12-121, Idaho Code. As the
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City is the prevailing party, and the action was one for less than $25,000.00,the City should recover
its costs and attorney fees pursuant to $12-120(1), Idaho Code. Attorney fees are also requested
pursuant to Rule 41, I.A.R.
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CROSS APPEAL
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING AN AWARD TO
THE CITY OF ITS ATTORNEY FEES
The district court erred in denying the City's request for attorney fees. The court ruled that
the City was the prevailing party (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, p 328), awarded costs, but
found that the City was not entitled to attorney fees under $5 12-117 and 12-121, Idaho Code or Rule
68 I.R.C.P. The court held that it could not find that Beckstead acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law under $12-117(2)(R., Vol. 2, pp 329-330) and that Beckstead's action could not be
deemed to have been pursued frivolously as required under 5 12-121, Idaho Code and Rule 54(c)(l)
I.R.C.P. (R., Vol. 2, pp 330-331). The court ruled the same as to the Rule 68 request for attorney
fees stating that it could not find that Beckstead had frivolously pursued his claim. The district court
failed to address the Citv's claim for attorney fees pursuant to 612-120. LC.
The City is the prevailing party. The district court found for the City against Beckstead
denying all of Beckstead's claims. The City escaped all liability in this case. The court ruled in its
Memorandum Decision on attorney fees that the City was the prevailing party. This Court found in
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc,. 141 Idaho 716,719, 117 P.3d 130
(2005) that the district court had erred in failing to find that Nord was a prevaling party. It held:
"Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating
was a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused
too much attention on the Company's less than tremendous success
on its counterclaim and seemingly ignored the hct that the Company
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avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly
undervalued the Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation,
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large
money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the
value of a successful defense. In this case, logic suggests that a
verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its counterclaim
(albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing
party".
The Court in Eighteen Mile remanded the case to the district court directing it to award
attorney fees to Nord pursuant to 5 12-120, LC.

A district court's determination whether a party is a prevailing party will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 2008 Opinion No. 45, (March 28,2008)
The City is entitled to its attorney fees pursuant to 5 12-120(1). That section reads in part
as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsectiolls (3) and (4) of this section, in
any action where the amount pleaded is Twenty-five Thousand
dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees.

Beckstead's Second Amended Complaint sought to recover the sum of $13,153.64 (R., Vol.
1, p 65). The amount sought by Beckstead was less than $25,000.00. The award of attorney fees
to the prevailing party is mandatory pursuant to said section and is not subject to the standard of
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acting "without areasonable basis in fact or law" as required by $12-117, I.C. or the necessity to find
that Beckstead acted in a frivolous manner in initiating the action as required under $ 12-121, I.C.
The City claims the sum of $7,717.50 in attorney fees. Said sum was fully accounted for in
the Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees submitted by the City, as well as in its
Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney Fees (R., Vol. 2, pp. 3 13-324). The district court's
decision denying these fees should be reversed and the Court should award said fees to the City.
Attorney fees should have also been awarded by the district court pursuant to $12-1 17 and
512-121, Idaho Code.
The provisions of $12-1 17, I.C. require a court to award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney fees and costs if the party against whom thejudgment is rendered acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. While the provisions of $12-120, I.C., should mandate the award of attorney
fees, the Court may also rely upon $ 12-117, I.C. to award fees. The only question that the court has
to determine under this section is whether Beckstead acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The provisions of the ordinance upon which Beckstead relied were explicit. Beclcstead had
to make a preliminary request to the City that he wished to be reimbursed for his construction costs.
The same would be submitted to the City, and the City would cause competitive bids to be obtained.
Beckstead never made the City aware of his request that he wanted to be reimbursed, although fully
aware ofhis costs at the time of construction. Beckstead waited one year before he notified the City
through his letter of October 22, 2004, that he wanted to meet with the City to discuss
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reimbursement. Thus, the court ruled that Beckstead had failed to comply with the provisions of the
Ordinance, and had further failedto comply with the notice of claim provisions. Beckstead was fully
aware that he had not complied with the Ordinance or the notice provisions in that Beckstead's
attorney submitted aNotice of Claim in 2006, nearly three years later. There was no reasonable basis
of fact or law upon which Beckstead could have relied in bringing his claim. Thus, the City is
entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs based upon $ 12-1 17, Idaho Code.
$12-121, LC. allows an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. This code section
is limited by Rule 54(e)(l), I.R.C.P. which requires the court to determine whether Beckstead
brought or pursued his claim frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. For the reasons set
forth in the City's argument for award of attorney fees under $12-117, I.C. the City contends that
Beckstead's claim was frivolous and without foundation. Failure to comply with the Ordinance, and
failure to timely file a Notice of Claim, precluded Beckstead from proceeding with his action. To
have pursued it, regardless of the Ordinance or failure to timely file Notice of Claim, is frivolous and
unreasonable.
CONCLUSION

Becksted sought city approval for a subdivision within Preston, Idaho. In order to construct
the same, Beckstead had to have adequate fire flow for his subdivision. The Franklill County Fire
District denied approval unless Beckstead replaced an existing four inch line with a new six inch
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line. The city requested oversizing to a twelve inch line, and Beckstead constructed the line in
October, 2003. The City paid Beckstead for the oversizing. He was fully aware of his costs for
constructing the same by November, 2003. Prior to constructing the line, Beckstead never invoked
ordinance 16.28.030B by advising the City that he wished to take advantage of that ordinance. As
the City was unaware of Beckstead wanting to be reimbursed, it did not call for competitive bids,
verify the competitive bids, collect the bid price from Beckstead, prepare drawings showing
benefitted properties, or enter into an agreement with Beckstead to define the commencement and
termination dates of the agreement, the properties benefitted, and the amounts to be collected by the
City from each intervening connection. As Beckstead had failed to invoke the ordinance, there were
no duties imposed upon the City, and the decision of the district court should be affirmed.
The city has not been unjustly enriched, as the requirement to construct the line was imposed
by the Franklin County Fire District, not the City. None of the money received by the City would
have reimbursed Becksted. Instead, it was received only for the purpose of reimbursing the City's
cost in making connections. Beckstead, who received the benefit of the waterline and the fire flow
that it provided to his twenty-two lot subdivision, is the true beneficiary of his labors. The only
unjust enrichment that would result would be that to Beckstead ifhe were permitted to be reimbursed
from the City coffers. In addition thereto, Beckstead failed to file a notice of claim alleging unjust
enrichment. By his failure to file notice ofthat claim, he is denied the right to recover.
Beckstead failed to file a timely notice of claim. Beckstead's first claim was actually filed
on July 31, 2006. As he knew of his construction costs in November, 2003, he was required to
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submit a claim against the City by May, 2004. His only communication with the City in regard to
reimbursement prior to his notice of claim of July 3 1,2006, was the letter to the City of October 22,
2004. This letter was filed with the City more than 180 days after he had completed constructiou
and knew of his costs.
The letter of October 22,2004, should not be construed to constitute aclaim pursuant to the
provisions of 56-907, Idaho Code. It fails to set forth the criteria required by that statute, and
specifically fails to set forth any amount of damages or make claim for payment of the same. The
only communicatioii with the City which does set forth an amount of damages and a claim for
payment of the same is the Notjce of Claim of July 3 1,2006.
As aresult of Beckstead's failure to invoke the ordinance or to timely submit aclaim, the City
has been misled to its injury. All connections were made prior to Beckstead's letter of October 22,
2004. All fees, which were merely reimbursement to the City for its costs, had been collected. If
payment were required, it would be made from tax revenues of the City, and not from additional fees
received from intervening connections.
The district court erred in failing to award the City its attorney fees. 5 12-120, I. C., requires
the payment of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party when the action is one for less than
$25,000.00. Beckstead's claim was for less than this sum, and as the City was the prevailing party,
it should have been awarded its attorney fees. Furthermore, Beckstead's cause of action, and claims
are without areasonable basis in fact or law and are frivolous in nature under $512-117 and 12-121,
LC. The case should be remanded to the district court to determine reasonable attorney fees.
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The decision of the district.court finding for the City should be affirmed. The decision of the
district court denying the City its attorney fees should be overruled and the case remanded to
determine appropriate attorney fees. The City should recover its costs and attorney fees oil appeal.

Respectfully submitted t h i s d d a y of April, 2008.
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